## 1NC

### 1NC – Kritik

#### Blackness exists as a metaaporia that interrogates the cyclical ways violence onto blackness is morphed and ultimately appropriated. The 1AC relies on a redemptive narrative of humanity that is fundamentally inaccessible for blacks. Their project is ultimately meant to hide and recreate moments of black death for the sake of redeeming Human life.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 13-17, JMH]

For most critical theorists writing after 1968, the word aporia is used to designate a contradiction in a text or theoretical undertaking. For example, Jacques Derrida suggests an aporia indicates “a point of undecidability, which locates the site at which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.” But when I say that Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action, the addition of the prefix meta- goes beyond what Derrida and the poststructuralists meant—it raises the level of abstraction and, in so doing, raises the stakes. In epistemology, a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, the prefix meta- is used to mean about (its own category). Metadata, for example, are data about data (who has produced them, when, what format the data are in, and so on). In linguistics, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself). Metadiscussion is a discussion about discussion (not any one particular topic of discussion but discussion itself). In computer science, a theoretical software engineer might be engaged in the pursuit of metaprogramming (i.e., writing programs that manipulate programs). **Afropessimism**, then, **is** less of a theory and more of **a metatheory: a critical project that, by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates.** Again, Afropessimism is, in the main, more of a metatheory than a theory. **It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the meta-aporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true.** If, as Afropessimism argues, Blacks are not Human subjects, but are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and sadomasochistic pleasures, then this also means that, at a higher level of abstraction, the claims of universal humanity that the above theories all subscribe to are ~~hobbled~~ [constricted] by a meta-aporia: a contradiction that manifests whenever one looks seriously at the structure of Black suffering in comparison to the presumed universal structure of all sentient beings. Again, Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action— Black people are the wrench in the works. Blacks do not function as political subjects; instead, our flesh and energies are instrumentalized for postcolonial, immigrant, feminist, LGBTQ, transgender, and workers’ agendas. These so-called **allies are never authorized by Black agendas predicated on Black ethical dilemmas. A Black radical agenda is terrifying to most people on the Left**—think Bernie Sanders—**because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of social, political, or national redemption**. This crisis, no, this catastrophe, this realization that I am a sentient being who can’t use words like “being” or “person” to describe myself without the scare quotes and the threat of raised eyebrows from anyone within earshot, was crippling. I was convinced that if a story of Palestinian redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the return of the land, a spatial, cartographic redemption; and if a story of class redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the restoration of the working day so that one stopped working when surplus values were relegated to the dustbin of history, a temporal redemption; in other words, since postcolonial and working-class redemption were possible, then there must be a story to be told through which one could redeem the time and place of Black subjugation. I was wrong. **I had not dug deep enough to see that though Blacks suffer the time and space subjugation of cartographic deracination and the hydraulics of the capitalist working day, we also suffer as the hosts of Human parasites, though they themselves might be the hosts of parasitic capital and colonialism**. I had looked to theory (first as a creative writer, and only much later as a critical theorist) to help me find/create the story of Black liberation—Black political redemption. What I found instead was that **redemption, as a narrative mode, was a parasite that fed upon me for its coherence. Everything meaningful in my life had been housed under the umbrellas called “critical theory” and “radical politics.”** The parasites had been capital, colonialism, patriarchy, homophobia. And now it was clear that I had missed the boat. My parasites were Humans, all Humans—the haves as well as the have-nots. If critical theory and radical politics are to rid themselves of the parasitism that they heretofore have had in common with radical and progressive movements on the Left, that is, if we are to engage, rather than disavow, **the difference between Humans who suffer through an “economy of disposability” and Blacks who suffer by way of “social death,” then we must come to grips with how the redemption of the subaltern** (a narrative, for example, of Palestinian plenitude, loss, and restoration) **is made possible by the (re)instantiation of a regime of violence that bars Black people from the narrative of redemption**. This requires (a) an understanding of the difference between loss and absence, and (b) an understanding of how the narrative of subaltern loss stands on the rubble of Black absence. Sameer and I didn’t share a universal, postcolonial grammar of suffering. Sameer’s loss is tangible, land. The paradigm of his dispossession elaborates capitalism and the colony. When it is not tangible it is at least coherent, as in the loss of labor power. But how does one describe the loss that makes the world if all that can be said of loss is locked within the world? **How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”?** Sameer forced me to face the depth of my isolation in ways I had wanted to avoid; a deep pit from which neither postcolonial theory, nor Marxism, nor a gender politics of unflinching feminism could rescue me. Why is anti-Black violence not a form of racist hatred but the genome of Human renewal; a therapeutic balm that the Human race needs to know and heal itself? Why must the world reproduce this violence, this social death, so that social life can regenerate Humans and prevent them from suffering the catastrophe of psychic incoherence— absence? Why must the world find its nourishment in Black flesh?

#### Slavery morphs and recodes itself in different ways- it relies on the sadism of liberal progress narratives to perfect itself and maintain “life”. Only the alternative can disrupt this project and render these promises incoherent.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 94-96, JMH]

Northup’s book implies, without stating directly, why this generalization of sadism—brutality as the constituent element of family bonding—cannot be understood as being triggered by transgressions. It is as ubiquitous as the air he breathes. “It was rarely a day passed without more whippings . . . It is the literal, unvarnished truth, that the crack of the lash and the shrieking of slaves, can be heard from dark till bedtime . . .” Patsey and Solomon, unlike Stella and me, were living in a place and time when civil society and the Human were neither ashamed nor embarrassed by this. A thousand miles upriver and one hundred twenty six years later, Josephine was shocked by this inheritance, but it didn’t take her long to recover, and to claim it. Though the structure of Stella’s “life” (or, better, **the paradigm of social death**, for the quotation marks are essential here) **cannot be reconciled with the** structure of Josephine’s life (or **the paradigm of social life**), there is a connection. But **this connection is parasitic and perverse—regardless of what the socially dead Black person (i.e., Stella and Patsey) or the socially alive Human (i.e., Josephine or Mary Epps) might say about their “relationship.”** It is parasitic because White and non-Black subjectivity cannot be imbued with the capacity for selfknowledge and intersubjective community without anti-Black violence; without, that is, the violence of social death. In other words, **White people and their junior partners need anti-Black violence to know they’re alive.\*** If Hattie McDaniel were to truly die, as Stella proclaimed, it would be tantamount to the death of a parasite’s host. This is what makes social death something more surreal than the end of breath. It is, in the words of David Marriott, a deathliness that saturates life, not an embalming; a resource for Human renewal. **It is perverse for many reasons: one of which is the fact that as civil society matures** (from 1853 to December 1979, when it all went south with Josephine)—and we move historically from the obvious technologies of chattel slavery to universal suffrage, the discourse of human rights, and the concept of universal access to civil society— the anti-Black violence necessary for the elaboration and maintenance of White (and non-Black) subjectivity gets repressed and becomes increasingly unavailable to conscious (as opposed to unconscious) speech. (“I judge people by the quality of their character,” as Dr. King said, “and not the color of their skin”; or the commonly spoken, “At the end of the day, we’re all Americans and we’re in this together”— and other such malarkey of the conscious mind.) But the pageantries of naked and submissive Black flesh, pageantries of bleeding backs and buttocks, whip marks, amputations, and faces closed by horse bits, provide evidence of the role sadism plays in the constitution of White subjectivity, and *12 Years a Slave* makes this visible on the screen, despite its repression in the narrative of both the film and civil society writ large. It is tempting and commonplace to reduce Mary and Edwin Epps’s sadism to individual psychopathology. Or one might think that Edwin Epps is one of a group of exceptionally sadistic people who lived in an exceptionally sadistic time and place. But the film, and to an even greater extent the autobiography, sees (rather than narrates) sadism—the sexual perversion in which gratification is obtained by inflicting physical or mental pain on a love object—not as the individual pathology of a handful of people, but as a generalized condition; generalized in that pleasure, as a constituent element of communal life, cannot be disentangled from anti-Black violence. Conventionally, **the object of sadism can**, tomorrow, **become the subject of sadism**. But the sadism that constitutes the spectacles of *12 Years a Slave*, and which constitutes early nineteenth century society, is not imbued with such reciprocity. The Slaves of social death cannot switch places and make Edwin Epps or his equally cruel wife the love objects of their collective sadism. If they did so in private (if Patsey beat Edwin or Mary in a private bedroom encounter, for example) **it is because such a reversal was occasioned and allowed—in other words, the master used his prerogative and power to play a different game, one in which he suffers because suffering fulfills his fantasy and because, unlike the Slave, his fantasies have “objective value.”** Such role reversals do not imbue the encounter with reciprocity. **The changes that begin to occur after the Civil War and up through the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, and the American election of a Black president are merely changes in the weather. Despite the fact that the sadism is no longer played out in the open as it was in l840, nothing essential has changed.**

#### Leftist counter-hegemonic resistance use a unique form of terror on black thought as it ignores any possibility for realizing black desires further locking the absolute dereliction of blackness. [also performance bad]

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 220-222, JMH]

It would be misguided, even mendacious, to have said to the people in the van that the Patriot Act did not affect Black people; or to champion an anti-immigration sentiment of any sort. But it would be just as misguided and mendacious to suggest that the Patriot Act’s relative corruption of the integrity of the Bill of Rights, or the relative rigidity or elasticity of access to (and within) the institutionality of civil society, can help us think through Black folks’s unique grammar of suffering. Put another way, **Black thought (and therefore Black liberation) is threatened not only by the state, but by the interests and actions of the loyal opposition in the airport shuttle.** In fact, Black thought is threatened by a three-tiered ensemble of terror. Our intellectual capability to do the work is not what’s at issue here. What’s at stake is our capacity to work against the constraints of analogy, the terrorism of intra-Human exchange—the hydraulics of my ride to the airport. **First, there is the terrorism of what Gramsci referred to as “political society”: the police, the army, the prison-industrial complex. Second, there is the terror of civil society’s hegemonic blocs and its clusters of affilial formations: like the mainstream media, the university, or the megachurch.** But **there is also a third tier of terror with which Black thought must contend. And that is the terror of counter-hegemonic and revolutionary thought: the logic of White feminism, the logic of working-class struggle, the logic of multicultural coalitions, and the logic of immigrant rights. The unrelenting terror elaborated whenever Black people’s so-called allies think out loud.** The stakes of this three-tiered terror are high because of their impact upon Black people’s capacity to capture and be captured by our own imaginations. **These three tiers scaffold the death of Black desire. And our capacity to imagine and to fantasize while assuming our position is imbricated in our capacity to think theoretically: to give our political desire “objective value.”** This third tier of terror that threatens the imagination and the enunciation of Black thought—the terror of left-wing counterhegemonic alliances—should not be dismissed as incidental or inessential, nor should it be trivialized as an ensemble of bad attitudes that can be overcome through dialogue, as the Race Rave conference in Santa Cruz had assumed. For it is an essential terror; it is as constitutive of an anti-Black world as the military and the megachurch. It doesn’t simply kill or warehouse Black thought the way the first tier kills and warehouses the Black body. Nor does it simply crowd out a Black emancipatory ensemble of questions the way traditional organs of hegemony crowd out the performance of the common man or woman’s ensemble of questions. **This third tier terrorizes through an interdiction against Black performance, coupled with a demand for Black performance—dance, Johnny, dance. We might say that it demands the performance of Black thought, albeit under erasure**. It wants us to sing the blues; but instead of those Ain’t Got No Life Worth Living Blues (instead of the social death blues), it wants Black folks singing the:

—Ain’t Got No Green Card Blues —Ain’t Got No Abortion Blues —Ain’t Got No Right to Privacy Blues —Ain’t Got No Border-Crossing Blues —Ain’t Got No Same-Sex Weddin’ Blues —Ain’t Got No Ciba Lubbaties Blues

Civil society expands and contracts to accommodate or diminish (but never banish carte blanche) a multitude of positions and identities—Jews, Arabs, Asian Immigrants, Latinos, Italians, White women, and Native Americans. The annals of history show nineteenth century transitions from territories to states as being manifest with a great and conflicting diversity of views with respect to all of these groups. These fledgling fifty states even found themselves, on rare occasion (as in the case of California), debating the civic and social membership of Native Americans. But civil society would not know the boundary, the frontier, of such debates, which is to say it would lose all coherence and not be able to draw the line between social life and social death, if not for the presence of Black folks. Black people hold that line for White people and for everyone else. **Blacks give even the most degraded position a sense of human possibility because we are the locus of human impossibility. Whatever grace others may fall from, they will never be Black**. This is a comforting thought. The flame of human warmth. There’s something organic to Blackness that makes it essential to the construction of civil society. But there’s also something organic to Blackness that portends the destruction of civil society. There’s nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around: there’s something organic to civil society that makes it essential to the destruction of the Black body. Blackness is a positionality of “absolute dereliction,” abandonment, in the face of civil society, and therefore cannot be liberated or be made legible through counter-hegemonic interventions. Black suffering is not a function of the performance(s) of civil society, but of the existence of civil society. For the Pakistani driver, the White professor, and his White wife, civil society is an ensemble of constraints and opportunities. But for the Black, civil society is a murderous projection. In light of this, **coalitions and social movements—even radical social movements like the Prison Abolition Movement—bound up in the solicitation of hegemony, so as to fortify and extend the interlocutory life of civil society, ultimately accommodate only the satiable demands and legible conflicts of civil society’s junior partners** (such as immigrants, White women, the working class), **but foreclose upon the insatiable demands and illegible antagonisms of Blacks.** In short, **whereas such coalitions and social movements cannot be called the outright handmaidens of anti-Blackness, their rhetorical structures, political desire, and their emancipatory horizon are bolstered by a lifeaffirming anti-Blackness; the death of Black desire.**

#### Their frame of radicality relies on subjective vertigo as they seek overcome the conceptual framework of the proliteriate. The Black psyche experiences object vertigo the inability to experience particular grammars of self-actualization absent the white guise that overdetermines subjectivity. This loss of loss itself cannot never be captured within a revolutionary but can only be disrupted by investigating the unconscious.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 245-248, JMH]

Throughout this book I have argued that the Black is a sentient being though not a Human being. The Black’s and the Human’s disparate relationship to violence is at the heart of this failure of analogy. **The Human suffers contingent violence, violence that kicks in when he resists (or is perceived to resist) the disciplinary discourse of civil society’s rules and laws. But Black peoples’ saturation by violence is a paradigmatic necessity, not simply the performance of contingency.** To be constituted by and disciplined by violence, to be gripped simultaneously by subjective and objective vertigo, is indicative of a life that is radically different from the life of a sentient being who is constituted by discourse and disciplined by violence when he breaks with the ruling discursive codes. **When we begin to assess revolutionary armed struggle in this comparative context we find that Human revolutionaries (workers, women, gays and lesbians, postcolonial subjects) suffer subjective vertigo when they respond to the state violence with revolutionary violence; but they are spared objective vertigo.** This is because the most disorienting aspects of their lives are induced by the struggles that arise from intra-Human conflicts over competing conceptual frameworks and disputed cognitive maps, such as the American Indian Movement’s demand for the return of Turtle Island vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain territorial integrity, or the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional’s (FALN) demand for Puerto Rican independence vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain Puerto Rico as a territory. But for the Black, that is, for the Slave, there are no cognitive maps, no conceptual frameworks of suffering and dispossession that are analogous with the myriad maps and frameworks that explain the dispossession of Human subalterns. The structural violence that subsumes Black insurgents’ cognitive maps and conceptual frameworks also subsumes my intellectual and creative efforts as a writer. As a Black writer I am tasked with making sense of this violence without being overwhelmed and disoriented by it. In other words, my writing must somehow be indexical of that which exceeds narration, while being ever mindful of the incomprehension the writing would foster, the failure, that is, of interpretation were the indices to actually escape the narrative. The stakes of this dilemma are almost as high for the Black writer facing the reader as they are for the Black insurgent facing the police and the courts. For the intellectual act of embracing members of the Black Liberation Army as beings worthy of empathic consideration is terrifying. **One’s writing proceeds with fits and starts that have little to do with the problems of building the thesis or finding the methodology to make the case. As I write, I am more aware of the rage and anger of my reader-ideal (an angry mob as readers) than I am of my own desires and strategies for assembling my argument. Vertigo seizes me with a rash of condemnations that emanate from within me and swirl around me.** I am speaking to me but not through me, yet there seems to be no other way to speak. I am speaking through the voice and gaze of a mob of, let’s just say it, White Americans; and my efforts to marshal a mob of Black people, to conjure the Black Liberation Army, smack of compensatory gestures. It is not that the BLA doesn’t come to my aid, that they don’t push back, but neither I nor my insurgent allies can make the case that we are worthy of our suffering and justified in our actions and not terrorists and apologists for terror who should be locked away forever. How can we be worthy of our suffering without being worthy of ourselves? I press on, even though the vertigo that seizes me is so overwhelming that its precise nature—subjective, stemming from within me, or objective, catalyzed by my context, the raging throng—cannot be determined. I have no reference points apart from the mob that gives no quarter. **If I write, “Freedom fighter,”** from within my ear **they scream, “Terrorist”! If I say, “Prisoner of war,” they chant, “Cop killer”!** Their denunciations are sustained only by assertion, but they ring truer than my painstaking exegesis. No firewall protects me from them; no liberated psychic zone offers me sanctuary. I want to stop and turn myself in. The Black psyche emerges within a context of structural or paradigmatic violence that cannot be analogized with the emergence of White or non-Black psyches**. The upshot of this is that the Black psyche is in a perpetual war with itself because it is usurped by a White gaze that hates the Black imago and wants to destroy it. The Black self is a divided self or, better, it is a juxtaposition of hatred projected toward a Black imago and love for a White ideal: hence the state of war.** This state of being at war forecloses upon the possession of elements constitutive of psychic integration: bearing witness (to suffering), atonement, naming and recognition, representation. As such, one cannot represent oneself, even to oneself, as a bona fide political subject, as a subject of redress. Black political ontology is foreclosed in the unconscious just as it is foreclosed in the court, for the “black ego, far from being too immature or weak to integrate, is an absence haunted by its and others’ negativity. In this respect the memory of loss is its only possible communication.” It is important to note that loss is an effect of temporality; it implies a metonymic chain that absence cannot apprehend. Put differently but no less to the point, “loss” indicates a prior plenitude, “absence” does not. **Loss is an impoverished and inaccurate concept when deployed to think about Black suffering.** And the paucity of its explanatory power is also part and parcel of the paucity of the analogies politicos draw between Black insurgency and the insurgency of other oppressed beings. **This is not about playing oppression Olympics, as some would have it; it’s about making critical assessments of what have heretofore been insufficiently comparative analyses of the multiracial wretched of the earth;** specifically, **what has been missing is sufficient comparison between the gratuitous violence of social death and the contingent violence of colonial, class, and gendered subjugation: a comparative analysis of the dead and the living.**

#### Only through embracement of disorder and incoherence via the alternative are we able create revolutionary politics that disrupt the generative mechanism of civil society.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 249-252, JMH]

Again, though this is a bond between Blacks and Whites (or, more precisely, between Black and non-Blacks), it is produced by a violent intrusion that does not cut both ways. Whereas the phobic bond is an injunction against Black psychic integration and Black filial and affilial relations, it is the lifeblood of White psychic integration and filial (which is to say, domestic) and affilial (or institutional) relations. For whoever says “rape” says Black; whoever says “prison” says Black; and whoever says “AIDS” says Black—the Negro is a phobogenic object: a past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of complete disorder. If a social movement is to be neither social democratic nor Marxist, in terms of its structure of political desire, then it should grasp the invitation of social death embodied in Black beings. **If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the “~~Negro~~” “Black” has been inviting Whites, as well as civil society’s junior partners** (for example, Palestinians, Native Americans, Latinx) **to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps.** They have been, and remain today (even in the most anti-racist movements, like anti-colonial insurgency) invested elsewhere. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the U.S. and the world. **This is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism, or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a program of complete disorder. One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one’s politics are to be underwritten by a revolutionary desire.** What other lines of accountability are there when slaves are in the room? There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself. No one, for example, has ever been known to say, Gee whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all. Few so-called radicals desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness—and the state of political movements in the U.S. today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: Gee-whiz, if only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all. Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the joy of Black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain inorgasmic in the face of civil society—with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If, **through this stasis or paralysis, they try to do the work of prison abolition, that work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (such as the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the Black: radical politics morphed into extensions of the master’s prerogative.** In this way, **social formations on the Left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between Humans and Slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding-out scenarios of Black antagonisms, simply feeding Black people’s frustration.** Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demanding a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the Black subject (whether a prison-slave or a prison-slave-in-waiting) gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil society, the Black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that reclaims Blackness not as a positive value, but as a politically enabling site, to quote Fanon, of “absolute dereliction.” It is a “scandal” that rends civil society asunder. Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a Black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must nonetheless be pursued to the death. But lest we forget, this is not a question of volition. It is not as simple as waking up in the morning and deciding, in one’s conscious mind, to “do the right thing.” **For when we scale up from the terrain of the psyche to the terrain of armed struggle, we may be faced with a situation in which the eradication of the generative mechanism of Black suffering is something that is not in anyone’s interest.** Eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is not in the interest of Palestinians and Israelis, as my shocking encounter with my friend Sameer, on a placid hillside, suggests; because his anti-Black phobia mobilizes the fantasy of belonging that the Israeli state might otherwise strip him of. For him to secure his status as a relational being (if only in his unconscious), his unconscious must labor to maintain the Black as a genealogical isolate. “The shame and humiliation runs even deeper if the Israeli soldier was an Ethiopian Jew.” The Israelis are killing the Palestinians, literally; but psychic life, Human capacity for relations, is vouchsafed by a libidinal relay between them and their common labor to avoid ~~“niggerization”~~ [~~negroization~~] [racialization] (Fanon). **This relay is the generative mechanism that makes life life. It is also the generative mechanism of Black suffering and isolation. The end of this generative mechanism would mean the end of the world. We would find ourselves peering into the abyss.** This trajectory is too iconoclastic for working-class, post-colonial, and/or radical feminist conceptual frameworks. The Human need to be liberated in the world is not the same as the Black need to be liberated from the world; which is why even their most radical cognitive maps draw borders between the living and the dead. Finally**, if we push this analysis to the wall, it becomes clear that eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is also not in the interests of Black revolutionaries. For how can we disimbricate Black juridical and political desire from the Black psyche’s desire to destroy the Black imago, a desire that constitutes the psyche?** In short, bonding with Whites and non-Blacks over phobic reactions to the Black imago provides the Black psyche with the only semblance of psychic integration it is likely to have: the need to destroy a Black imago and love a White ideal. “In these circumstances, having a ‘white’ unconscious may be the only way to connect with—or even contain—the overwhelming and irreparable sense of loss. The intruding fantasy offers the medium to connect with the lost internal object, the ego, but there is also no ‘outside’ to this ‘real fantasy’ and the effects of intrusion are irreparable.” This raises the question, who is the speaking subject of Black insurgent testimony; who bears witness when the Black insurgent takes the stand? Who is writing this book?

#### Only the alternative’s unflinching interrogation into the continual enslavement of blackness can overcome the failures of past, present, and future systems of reform that describe enslavement as a contingent event and not a flat lined existence.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 100-104, JMH]

When in Dr. Zhou’s office, Stella had said, “What’s the matter, Frank? Are you afraid we’ll tarnish your father’s reputation?” she had put her finger on the pulse of a desire to be special that beat inside my heart. In my unconscious I wanted to latch on to an element of Whiteness, or Humanness (since Dr. Zhou wasn’t White), that would set me apart from other Blacks. But this desire was deeper than Stella or I suspected at the time. An unconscious wish for my father’s prestige (which was as faux as the prestige Solomon thought he had accrued from his skills as an engineer and his talents as a musician) to seep into my being by osmosis. I had dropped his name to get us the appointment. I would drop his name in the weeks and months to come to open other doors as well. This kind of reasoning is universal. But what is not universal, what belongs to Black people and Black people alone, is a deeper desire sparked by a deeper structure of oppression**. When you intuit for the first time in your life that you live in a soup of violence that is prelogical,** a kind of violence that is as legitimate if it’s wielded by “ordinary” citizens, such as Josephine, as it is if wielded by sanctioned enforcers of the law, and that your father’s position and prestige are no more the keys to a sanctuary than the position and prestige of someone who is Black and orphaned, **you are faced with two choices: stare unflinchingly at the abyss as it stares unflinchingly at you, or take it out on the Black person near you who won’t leave you to your fantasy of being truly alive.** Anything to not have to face the fact that your sense of presence is no more than “borrowed institutionality.”\* This dynamic, this intra-Black imbroglio, is harder to discern in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, for the simple fact that the personas of the master class are no longer solidified in evil White men and evil White women who wield real whips on a real plantation. The master has been dispersed across the entire racial spectrum of people who are not Black. Dr. Zhou is as much a master as Edwin and Mary Epps, the antagonists in *12 Years a Slave*. In fact, the twentieth century shot the Eppses through a prism—they are not just people, they are ideas. They are ideas and personas that a young middle-class Black man like me had consciously fought against to the point of being kicked out of college, while deep in my unconscious I was a loyal supplicant who cared more about not simply the master’s feelings, but the stability of the master’s world, than I did about my own suffering and the suffering of Stella. It is hard to be a slave and feel that you are worthy, truly worthy, of your suffering as a slave. One hundred twenty-seven years before Josephine, before Cody, before Urban Risers, and before Dr. Zhou, the riff between Stella and me would have been clearer to see. We wouldn’t have walked home in symptomatic silence; our discord would have been played out in the open. At times, Stella would throw her sense of herself as a being from a special, quasi-Black dimension at me the way I threw my father’s status and my Dartmouth pedigree at her. She would let me know of the competence exhibited by the White men she had been with and the Jew she had married; she held them up as object lessons that I could never be or learn. That’s how most Black couples fight and argue, by firing White and non-Black people at each other. No, it’s more subtle than that. The bullets aren’t the White or non-Black people themselves but the ambience of recognition and incorporation in a world beyond the plantation. **We load our guns with deadly intangibles and shoot straight for the heart. Anyone who thinks nineteenth century slave narratives are reports on the past isn’t paying attention.** **Such a person will experience the analysis of Afropessimism as though they are being mugged, rather than enlightened; that is because they can’t imagine a plantation in the here and now.** But Afropessimism is premised on a comprehensive and iconoclastic claim: **that Blackness is coterminous with Slaveness: Blackness is social death**: which is to say that **there was never a prior metamoment of plenitude, never equilibrium: never a moment of social life**. Blackness, as a paradigmatic position (rather than as a set of cultural practices, anthropological accoutrements**) is elaborated through slavery. The narrative arc of the slave who is Black** (unlike Orlando Patterson’s generic Slave, who may be of any race) **is not an arc at all, but a flat line, what Hortense Spillers calls “historical stillness”: a flat line that moves from disequilibrium, to a moment in the narrative of faux-equilibrium, to disequilibrium restored and/ or rearticulated.** This kind of change, the transformative promise of a narrative arc, belongs to White men and their junior partners in civil society (non-Black immigrants, White and non-Black people who are queer, and non-Black women) but only in relation to each other. By transformative capacity I mean that, through struggle, non-citizens (in the legal and libidinal sense of the word—legal being Latinx undocumented immigrants, for example, and libidinal being anyone from a documented immigrant of color to a gay person to a nonBlack woman) can become citizens, because they are still Human; they are simply oppressed and therefore not so fully vested. But their transformative capacity stems not from their positive attributes but from the fact that they are not Black, they are not slaves. These fully vested citizens and not-so-fully vested citizens live through intra-communal narrative arcs of transformation; but where the Black is concerned, their collective unconscious calls upon Blacks as props, which they harness as necessary implements to help bring about their psychic and social transformation, and to vouchsafe the coherence of their own Human subjectivity. Nevertheless, the slave is a sentient being. Therefore, an existence void of transformative promise, which narrative holds out to human subjects, is a painful lesson for the slave to learn, much less accept. **I am not suggesting that Black people should resign themselves to the inevitability of social death—it is inevitable, in the sense that one is born into social death just as one is born into a gender or a class; but it is also constructed by the violence and imagination of other sentient beings**. Thus, like class and gender, which are also constructs, not divine designations, **social death can be destroyed. But the first step toward the destruction is to assume one’s position** (assume, not celebrate or disavow), and **then burn the ship or the plantation, in its past and present incarnations, from the inside out**. However, as Black people we are often psychically unable and unwilling to assume this position. This is as understandable as it is impossible. I was a lot like that when I met Stella. Stella was skeptical about the willingness of the FBI to help us unravel the skeins of aggression that were coming our way (from Josephine and Cody’s violence to the violence of whoever did not want Stella to bring her evidence against Urban Risers to court). Looking back, I realize that I believed that my father had standing in the community, that his position on multiple boards and his vice presidency at the university had somehow imbued us both with Human capacity, the capacity to be recognized and incorporated as something other than Black. I had no idea that the FBI had tracked me for four years, that there was a file on me; nor did it dawn on me that Stella’s social-change activism, especially her civil disobedience against the war and her plethora of counterculture and revolutionary friends, would militate against our being helped. But those aren’t even the fundamental reasons why I should have been skeptical: If the FBI has been tracking Black creative writers since 1919, if the FBI has been constantly updating and revising its list of Black writers earmarked for preventative detention (concentration camps**?),\* if the FBI, like every law enforcement agency in the United States, is organically anti-Black, then where is the line between prison and home?**

### 1NC – Advantage

#### Their critique of capitalism/neoliberalism continues anti-blackness – The assumption of the universality of capital’s impact ignores the differential effects of capital on black bodies

Woods 7 (Tryon Woods, professor of criminal justice at Sonoma State University, PhD in the Department of Criminology, Law & Society from UC Irvine, Summer 2007, “The Fact of Anti-Blackness: Decolonization in Chiapas and the Niger River Delta,” *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* Volume 5 Issue 3, modified, pg. 319-320)

This article considers Frantz Fanon’s interrogation of the fact of anti-blackness in light of the ongoing decolonization struggles in our current historical moment. 3 Debt regimes, structural adjustment, neoliberal military-prison industrial complexes, and corporate impunity are some of the idioms of power through which colonialist legacies and imperialist desires live today. The anti-globalization and anti-war movements have developed eloquent critiques of the vagaries of neo-liberalism, including the machinations of corporate media and the omnipresence of market relations. By obscuring the black’s singular relation to suffering, however, these important challenges serve to reconstitute the anti-black world. To make it plain: when critiques of globalization, such as those proffered by the Zapatistas out of southern Mexico, speak of solidarity with all peoples injured and threatened with extinction by neo-liberalism, they do nothing to undo the Manichean world Fanon shows us. In this “Manichean delirium,” the Black is overdetermined from the outside; to use Nigel Gibson’s formulation of Fanon, the “Black is body and the body’s death is death**”** (2003: 20). In other words, black people experience bodily punishment; they are imprisoned, harassed, beaten, or murdered; criminalized, stigmatized, tortured or killed; impoverished, diseased, exiled, or homeless not because of a particular political economy, nor because of national oppression or underdevelopment. They are not hunted down because they have organized themselves militarily to resist state violence and the designs of capita**l** for the exploitation of their lands, as in the case of the Zapatista Rebellion, the most prominent social movement currently active in Chiapas. Rather, they are subjected to premature death because they are black, and as such, they are the violence that must be countered and expunged.

#### The impact of blackness on oppression is greater, where capital makes things into exchange values, blackness reduces to subhuman objects

Woods 7 (Tryon Woods, professor of criminal justice at Sonoma State University, PhD in the Department of Criminology, Law & Society from UC Irvine, Summer 2007, “The Fact of Anti-Blackness: Decolonization in Chiapas and the Niger River Delta,” *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* Volume 5 Issue 3, modified, pg. 322)

In Wretched of the Earth, Fanon makes clear the distinction between domination and colonialism. The difference is that being dominated racially is not the same as having one’s humanity expunged. In the colonial condition, the humanity of the colonized becomes the thing that requires justiﬁcation: as Fanon puts it, not only must the designated inferior race ask who am I, but also, what am I? The universe of meanings that colonialism has created, that lexicon of endlessly repeating and entangled opposites, is therefore qualitatively distinct from the structure of the political economy. Although both levels structure the lived experiences of Africans and indigenous Americans, Fanon reminds us that the materiality of the colonized subject cannot be found in labor exploitation or national oppression. Rather, violence provides the materiality of the colonial subject (Judy 1998). The historical circumstances of being “locked in thingness by non-recognition,” as B. Marie Perinbam puts it, or in Fanon’s words, ﬁxed into the position of the thingslave, as one who “is condemned to bite himself,” means that consciousness is predicated on violence (Perinbam 1982: 20). This section brieﬂy considers, then, the violence that colonialism produces.

As a result of slavery, the concept of freedom in the West developed through its negation, unfreedom. Since to be human is to be free, the emergence of Western modernity came about through the production of “races.” Knowledge about human freedom in the modern world thus needs to be grounded in the historical production of slavery (Patterson 1982). One of the signifi- cant meanings of the African slave trade, then, is that violence against the black body is the precondition for the formation of the modern bourgeois state (Wilderson 2005). Africa as a concept remains the metaphor through which the West sees itself—or as Achille Mbembe puts it, Africa is a media- tion for the West’s self-deception (Mbembe 2001: 3). Africa thus becomes the site of lack, or absence, of non-being, for the West, going all the way back to Hegel, for whom Africa was the place where all that is for- eign to humanity is to be found. This non- being-ness is precisely the essence of a slave formation: the slave (the Black) and the slave formation (Africa) are figures and places without history. Being socially dead, expelled from humanity altogether, the slave’s central value lies in his or her use- fulness: he or she has nothing but an ap- pearance, only a body that the colonizer/ master can seize and use as needed**.** The constituent elements of slavery are thus not exploitation and alienation, but accumulation and fungibility—the condition of be- ing owned and used. The relationship between humanity and slavery is therefore a structural positionality marked by its use- fulness for the master/settler. In short, the world uses the black to establish what is not human**.** Fanon puts it succinctly: “The white man slaves to reach a human level” (1952: 9).

#### Black abjection is the root cause of capitalism---AND even if class struggle preceded slavery, fungibility shapes contemporary markets

Hardin & Towns 19, \*Carolyn, Assistant Professor of Media and Communication & American Studies @ Miami University. \*\*Armond R., Department of Communication Studies @ The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (December 2019, “Plastic Empowerment: Financial Literacy and Black Economic Life”, *American Quarterly*, Volume 71, Number 4, pg. 980-981)

W. E. B. Du Bois suggested the white worker’s choice and the black slave’s absence of choice were important components of the capitalistic distinction between blackness and whiteness. Du Bois argued white workers always held out hope that “they themselves might also become planters by saving money, by investment, by the power of good luck.”71 Black slaves come into existence not as exploited, which is to say “free” to sell their labor (choice), but expropriated in ways that mirror the extraction of natural resources.72 Another way to say this is that the slave, much like the tree or cattle, for Frank Wilderson,73 is the ground on which human capitalist exploitation stands. Julia Ott’s comprehensive review of research on slave capital bears this out: the transatlantic slave trade and slave-based Southern US commodity production created modern capitalism, financing transformations in technology, industry, and economy more thoroughly than any other capital input.74

Ian Baucom explains the connection between the objecthood of black slave bodies and the economic rationality of finance.75 According to Baucom, it was the transatlantic slave trade that birthed the modern financial calculation of value through insurance on slaves. The value of slave bodies as chattel, which could, if circumstances demanded, be cast overboard from a slave ship facing turbulent seas, was guaranteed in advance for the owners of slave ships by insurance policies. The calculation of the cost of that insurance was a foundational form of what Baucom variously terms “actuarial historicism” or “theoretical realism,” which are forms of rationality that “ground value in the loss of the singular and the invention of the average.”76 In other words, insurance on slave bodies evacuated their singularity more completely even than enslavement, rendering them placeholders of value, which could be converted into paper money either through exchange or through the exercise of an insurance contract once they were cast overboard. For Baucom, the modern credit economy and finance capitalism itself are founded on the reification of speculative values that the insured transatlantic trade in black slaves inaugurated. In his formulation, it is the white slave trader or actuary who can see through the “thingliness” of the objects of slavery to calculate their speculative value, embodying the “speculative culture of finance capital” that has much in common with the economic rationality invoked in the calculation of the abstract cost of “free” checking accounts, despite their very real lived costs for poor customers.77

These dynamics did not end with slavery. The twentieth century is rich with examples of outerdetermined black objecthood within capitalism.78 The 1939 Federal Housing Authority Underwriting Manual that served as both guide and tool for suburbanization in the US not only ratified the practice of “redlining” whereby neighborhoods of black families were drawn out of mortgage lending, but actually directed homeowners to use racial covenants to prevent black people from moving into their neighborhoods.79 Both redlining and racial covenants acted on black homeowners and potential buyers, making them objects to be circumscribed and excluded. They also prevented black people from becoming privileged subjects of the American mortgage boom, which was built and protected for those consumers who fit within the racialized subject position of homo economicus.

## Block

### Kritik

#### **Capitalism can in no way explain slavery. Slavery is dependent on symbolic value that structures the libidinal economy**

Wilderson 10 (Frank B. III, “Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pg. ix-x) \*\*we reject author’s use of ableist language

Also an indict of marx/cap K in general

Marx goes on to tell us that whether the worker saves, hoards, or squanders his money on drink, he “acts as a free agent” and so “learns to control himself, in contrast to the slave, who needs a master.” It is sad, in a funny sort of way, to think of a worker standing in the same relationship to the sellers of goods as any other buyer, simply because his use-values can buy a loaf of bread just like the capitalist’s capital can. But it is frightening to take this “same relationship” in a direction that Marx does not take it: If workers can buy a loaf of bread, they can also buy a slave. It seems to me that the psychic dimension of a proletariat who “stands in precisely the same relationship” to other members of civil society due to their intramural exchange in mutual, possessive possibilities, the ability to own either a piece of Black flesh or a loaf of white bread or both, is where we must begin to understand the founding antagonism between the something Mailer has to save and the nothing Baldwin has to lose. David Eltis is emphatic in his assertion that European civil society’s decision not to hunt for slaves along the banks of the Thames or other rivers in the lands of White people or in prisons or poor houses was a bad business decision that slowed the pace of economic development in both Europe and the “New World.” Eltis writes: “No Western European power after the Middle Ages crosses the basic divide separating European workers from full chattel slavery. And while serfdom fell and rose in different parts of early modern Europe and shared characteristics with slavery, serfs were not outsiders either before or after enserfment. The phrase ‘long distance serf trade’ is an oxymoron.” He goes on to show how population growth patterns in Europe during the 1300s, 1400s, and 1500s far outpaced population growth patterns in Africa. He makes this point not only to demonstrate how devastating chattel slavery was on African population growth patterns—in other words, to highlight its genocidal impact—but also to make an equally profound but commonly overlooked point: Europe was so heavily populated that had the Europeans been more invested in the economic value of chattel slavery than they were in the symbolic value of Black slavery and hence had instituted “a properly exploited system drawing on convicts, prisoners and vagrants. . . . [they] could easily have provided 50,000 [White slaves] a year [to the New World] without serious disruption to either international peace or the existing social institutions that generated and supervised these potential European victims.” I raise Eltis’s counterposing of the symbolic value of slavery to the economic value of slavery in order to debunk two gross misunderstandings: One is that work—or alienation and exploitation—is a constituent element of slavery. Slavery, writes Orlando Patterson, “is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” Patterson goes to great lengths to delink his three “constituent elements of slavery” from the labor that one is typically forced to perform when one is enslaved. Forced labor is not constitutive of enslavement because whereas it explains a common practice, it does not define the structure of the power relation between those who are slaves and those who are not. In pursuit of his “constituent elements” of slavery, a line of inquiry that helps us separate experience (events) from ontology (the capacities of power—or lack thereof—lodged in distinct and irreconcilable subject positions, e.g., Humans and Slaves), Patterson helps us denaturalize the link between force and labor so that we can theorize the former as a phenomenon that positions a body, ontologically (paradigmatically), and the latter as a possible but not inevitable experience of someone who is socially dead. The other misunderstanding I am attempting to correct is the notion that the profit motive is the consideration in the slaveocracy that trumps all others. David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe have gone to considerable lengths to show that, in point of fact, slavery is and connotes an ontological status for Blackness; and that the constituent elements of slavery are not exploitation and alienation but accumulation and fungibility (as Hartman puts it): the condition of being owned and traded. Patterson reminds us that though professional athletes and brides in traditional cultures can be said to be bought and sold (when the former is traded among teams and the latter is exchanged for a bride price), they are not slaves because (1) they are not “generally dishonored,” meaning they are not stigmatized in their being prior to any transgressive act or behavior; ( ) they are not “natally alienated,” meaning their claims to ascending and descending generations are not denied them; and ( ) they have some choice in the relationship, meaning they are not the objects of “naked violence.” The relational status of the athlete and the traditional bride is always already recognized and incorporated into relationality writ large. Unlike the Slave, the professional athlete and traditional bride are subjected to accumulation and fungibility as one experience among many experiences, and not as their ontological foundation. Eltis meticulously explains how the costs of enslavement would have been driven down exponentially had Europeans taken White slaves directly to America rather than sailing from Europe to Africa to take Black slaves to America. He notes that “shipping costs . . . comprised by far the greater part of the price of any form of imported bonded labor in the Americas. If we take into account the time spent collecting a slave cargo on the African coast as well, then the case for sailing directly from Europe with a cargo of [Whites] appears stronger again.” Eltis sums up his data by concluding that if European merchants, planters, and statesmen imposed chattel slavery on some members of their own society— say, only 50,000 White slaves per year—then not only would European civil society have been able to absorb the social consequences of these losses (i.e., class warfare would have been unlikely even at this rate of enslavement), but civil society “would [also] have enjoyed lower labor costs, a faster development of the Americas, and higher exports and income levels on both sides of the Atlantic.” But what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the latter which structures the libidinal economy of civil society. White chattel slavery would have meant that the aura of the social contract had been completely stripped from the body of the convict, vagrant, beggar, indentured servant, or child. This is a subtle point but one vital to our understanding of the relationship between the world of Blacks and the world of Humans. Even under the most extreme forms of coercion in the late Middle Ages and in the early modern period—for example, the provisional and selective enslavement of English vagrants from the early to mid-1500s to the mid-1700s —“the power of the state over [convicts in the Old World] and the power of the master over [convicts in the New World] was more circumscribed than that of the slave owner over the slave.”

#### We straight turn gordon

Kelley, 15—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Beyond Black Lives Matter,” Kalfou, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, (Fall 2015): 330-337, dml)

This implicit appeal to acknowledge us-to recognize our humanity, our dignity, and our right to live-is understandable in a world where the statesanctioned killing and caging of Black bodies is routine. But as George Lipsitz observed, such appeals are embedded in a humanist logic that emphasizes "interiority" and feeling, thereby elevating "the cultivation of sympathy over the creation of social justice."7 That is to say, our feelings of empathy in any representation of suffering are designed to be understood and individually felt rather than transformed into collective praxis. This is partly why concepts like reparations are so antithetical to modern liberalism. Given the trauma produced by an endless video loop of Black people dying at the hands of police officers who are almost never indicted, let alone prosecuted and convicted, collective healing and the cultivation of sympathy are to be expected. On one hand, this makes the movement's counterslogan, "All Lives Matter," all the more offensive and painful. "All Lives Matter" is heard and felt as a belittling or decentering of anti-Black racism. It trades on postracial myths of equivalency in suffering. On the other hand, sometimes we react to "All Lives Matter" with such hostility that it stands in as an unambiguous expression of anti-Black racism. Can we salvage these words? Don't we want to build a world in which every life is valuable, cherished, and sustained? Are we not seeking a world that recognizes multiple sites of dispossession and recognizes that state violence inside US borders is inseparable from US militarism around the world? The fact that we are compelled to a defensive position is a consequence of focusing on proving our value rather than critiquing the system that devalues all of us and destroys the world in the process.

The veracity of our humanity was never the issue-then or now. The problem lies with Western civilization's very construction of the human. As Sylvia Wynter, Cedric Robinson, Aimé Césaire and others have been saying for decades, the "Negro" was an invention, a fiction-like that of the Indian, the Oriental, the "Mexican," etc. Or in Frantz Fanon's oft-quoted line from The Wretched of the Earth: "It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject."8 Indeed, the entire structure of global white supremacy depends on such inventions, like the fictions of the Arab as non- or anti-Western and the "Immigrant" as essentially Latino/a, or the notion that indigenous people (in North America at least) are all dead. This is why we have such a hard time acknowledging that most so-called immigrants from Mexico and Central America are, in fact, indigenous.

The very foundations of Western civilization were built on such fabrications and enacted through violence. Once they crumble, so goes Western civilization's conceit as well as the massive philosophical smokescreen that enables (racial) capitalism-the greatest, most destructive, most violent crime wave in history-to masquerade as the engine of progress, a pure expression of freedom and liberty, the only path to human emancipation. The modern world that invented the Negro, the Oriental, the Indian, and the Savage as a means of inventing European Man was built on the theft of humans, theft of land and water, indiscriminate murder, violation of customary rights, moral economy, enclosure of the commons, destruction of the planet-outright lawlessness, justified by supposed rationality or what Weber might call instrumental rationality. To leave it at Black Lives Matter unintentionally conceals the crime. After all, these were the very processes that birthed the liberal humanism to which BLM activists seem to appeal.

In his book Forgeries of Memory and Meaning, Cedric Robinson further elaborates on the systems of racial maintenance and myth making, the "racial regimes" responsible for the inventions of the Negro (the Indian, the Oriental) and their relation to capital. What exactly are racial regimes? In Robinson's words, they "are constructed social systems in which race is proposed as a justification for the relations of power." The power is real and formidable but surprisingly unstable. For Robinson, "the covering conceit of a racial regime is a makeshift patchwork masquerading as memory and the immutable. Nevertheless, racial regimes do possess history, that is, discernible origins and mechanisms of assembly. But racial regimes are unrelentingly hostile to their exhibition."9 In other words, to say that anti-Blackness is foundational to Western civilization is not to say that it is fixed or permanent. On the contrary, it is incredibly fragile and must be constantly remade; it is epiphenomenal to the production of Blackness-which is an essential component of modern racial regimes, but not its totality. In the last century alone, racial regimes have been remade, reconfigured, destabilized, and consolidated many times, employing new technologies to circulate old racial fabulations and new fictions in the process of capitalist expansion.

Proving one's humanity will not uproot racial regimes, for the very evidence of our humanity is their raison d'etre. Our exploitation is evidence of our value, but it requires enormous intellectual, juridical, and psychic resources to conceal our humanity. Slavery was not just social death, but was based on a cost-benefit analysis that assumed the disposability of Black lives. The system of extracting surplus emerged within a logic of racial hierarchy and racial subjugation that dragged Africans, Asians, and Europeans proletarianized by enclosure to the lands of the Americas, Oceania, parts of South Asia and Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean-where indigenous people were dispossessed, enslaved, or exploited by other means. Enclosure is yet another example of theft and violence masking as "law, order, security": backed by the rule of law, the state employs violence to discipline, to reclassify, to criminalize, and to destroy sovereignty and create disorder. Enclosure is part of this process of war-a war on the commons, which ultimately turns some of the expropriated people into a proletariat (including European industrial, maritime, and landless rural labor, as well as prostitutes and beggars), turns a portion into settlers, and sends a portion to the workhouse. Some are merely casualties whose flesh mingles with the earth and whose bodies-sometimes hanging from a tree or broken on the wheel-serve to terrorize those who resist the new discipline.10

While the value of Black labor may have ebbed and flowed with the changing character of the global economy, there has never been a moment in US history when our humanity mattered, when Black people could enjoy full privileges and protections of citizenship. But the same can be said of most of the planet-at least until the mid-twentieth century, although I would venture to say this is still the case. What Black resistance calls into question is the inhumanity of the system, the inhumanity of those who subjugate in the name of civilization; it insists that the survival of humanity (and this is not the humanity defined by the Enlightenment) depends on the complete destruction of racial capitalism, patriarchy, and regimes of normativity.

As I wrote in the aftermath of the George Zimmerman verdict, unless we come to terms with this history, we will continue to believe that the system just needs to be tweaked, or the right-wing fringe defeated, or our humanity acknowledged.11 We will miss the routine character of state violence; its origins in the very formation of colonialism, slavery, and capitalism; and the ways in which routine violence has become a central component of US policies, including drone warfare and targeted killing. We cannot change the situation simply by finding the right legal strategy, the best policies, or recognition.

#### ROJ is to abolish the white debate community-

Harney 17 (Stefano Harney is a professor of Business Management at Singapore Management University. He co-wrote The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study with Fred Moten. “Stefano Harney Part 2 Interview by Michael Schapira & Jesse Montgomery,” Full Stop, August 10, 2017 //tjb)

It’s also good timing that you wrote to me about this comment I made to you in an earlier conversation because I just finished a terrific book called [*Dixie Be Damned*](https://www.akpress.org/dixie-be-damned.html) by Neal Shirley and Saralee Stafford. They write about insurrections in the South from the dismal swamp in the 18th century to a 1975 uprising in a North Carolina women’s prison. It’s stirring stuff and then in a really sound, clear-hearted concluding chapter they surprised me. They said **our enemies have been saved not by fascism but by democracy.** It should not have surprised me, given that we were just speaking about Du Bois and democratic despotism, but it did. They are right. And I think it is in this sense that a better university would be worse for us, has been worse for us, in a paradoxical way. Some ask, ‘Is another university possible?’ Well, that implies this one is possible but more than that it suggests another university would be better for us. I don’t know about that. This is not to say I do not find work like that of Marc Bousquet and Chris Newfield indispensable. I do. But there is something at stake in Shirley and Stafford’s book and I want to talk with you about it because I think it connects to your question about how the Undercommons book has been read and used. The authors quote Frank Wilderson on the way **blackness can never be disimbricated from the violence of slavery.** Then they say: ‘**Those who would risk extending solidarity across racial boundaries would find themselves the recipient of exemplary violence in order to instill fear of constant consequence for this treason. Ever after, *meaningful cross-racial affinity can only be found in moments of revolutionary violence*.**”  (Italics in the original.)Now this is an historical observation on their part, but to some extent it is also programmatic  for the authors. As an observation, well, they have just convinced me of its validity in the last 250 pages, and as program, well, I’m not a pacifist. **I’m for self-defense, and that can be violent.** **But do words like solidarity, affinity, to say nothing of the unlovely term allyship, accidentally preserve something we want to abolish?** And I feel bad using Shirley and Stafford to make this point because theirs is such a good book, but maybe that’s why I feel compelled to say, ‘even here’ this question comes up. What I mean is **who is this someone in solidarity with blackness, who is this ally of blackness, who is this someone with affinity to black struggle**? I think this means that this someone has his or her own struggles and is indicating that now she or he wants to join not in common struggles, but in the struggles of blackness. Because in a sense you have to have your own thing to be an ally or to be in solidarity. Ok, but what are your own struggles from which you would be offering solidarity, allyship, affinity? **Are you organizing in the white community, is that it? I think that is the implication**, that you have been working in white communities, and/or on the environment, or feminist issues, etc. But the problem is, **there’s no such thing as a white community. A white community is a contradiction in terms**, an oxymoron. **You can’t organize an oxymoron. The only thing you can do with a white community is work to abolish it**. Moreover at that point of abolition we may be able to say there is no such thing as a community, that a community is an oxymoron. You can’t commune and have a community. **Communing is anti-community. It’s undercommon.** Maybe the only kind of community that is possible is the maroon community, because it is by definition not a community, and when in some historical instances (of necessity even) it became one, it took on the same murderous qualities of any community. Okay, so then the question arising, if you do abolish the white community, what of the people who were marked as white, and in many cases who dwelt in the supremacy of whiteness, what becomes of them? Well, in the practice of abolition they will move closer to the only thing they ever had that was about life and not death, about love and not hate, blackness. **This is to say, people who present as white are not allies, or in solidarity, or showing affinity, because they have nothing of their own, no place from which to show this, no resource to bring, unless and until they embrace the one thing of their own they disown. The thing that can’t be owned *born(e)* of the owned, blackness.** Now **white people aren’t coming with much blackness, by definition.** And this is why the underlying humility motivating terms like ally, solidarity, and affinity is not misplaced, if that is indeed what underlies their use in practice. In any case, **whiteness is either absence or violence, and in either case, not much to offer as an ally. But on the other hand white people have a big role to play** in the revolutionary violence Shirley and Stafford speak of **because the act of abolition of white communities is a monumental task.** By contrast and in a sense to reverse while also honouring Wilderson’s initial point, Black people have for the very reason of this unrelenting violence and its brutal failure, a lot of blackness, if I can put it that way, a special, (under) privileged relationship to blackness, as Fred puts it. So another way to think of the historical events Shirley and Stafford are speaking about as cross-racial moments would be to think about these events as moments in which there was not a total coincidence between black people and blackness. In a way we could read moments of non-coincidence as moments not of liberation from blackness but generalization of blackness. But we have to be careful here. **Blackness is neither the opposite nor the total reversal or abolition of whiteness.** Blackness exists in/as the general antagonism. It’s always anti-colonial, always fugitive. So what we tried to do in the book is to think about how study, and planning, and logisticality, and hapticality named capacities for expanding

the social poesis of blackness, of the anti-regulatory, jurisgenerative improvisation of the use of each other. And we were thinking about how the undercommons of study might be a place where those in blackness and those coming into blackness might commune, might serve the debt together, in difference **but not separability**, as might say, not separability from that quantum blackness that moves across and against property, subjectivity, development, usufruction. And if you want to say **this is going to be a practice that is hard for a lot of people who do not experience the lived fact of the coincidence of being a black person and blackness, and it is going to be a humble practice, and even a practice of entering into service, feeling in debt, well that’s okay, cause all of that is what blackness is too.**

#### Libidinal economy is true

Chico et al 11 (A Primer on "Libidinal Economy" in Relation to Black Folks. Cosmic Hoboes: An Afropessimist Meditation (No)Space. <https://cosmichoboes.blogspot.com/2011/08/primer-on-libidinal-economy-in-relation.html>)

People who are interested in struggle need to understand the "libidinal economy." Coalition politicos like Al Sharpton like to tell us to put the unique experiences of black folks in the backseat to the interests of poor folks more generally. Such politicians expect us to submerge our interests as black people on the assumption that if poor people in general benefit from a political concession, poor black people will share equally in such benefits. Such politicos will continue to ignore the repeated evidence that a lot of nonblack people hate black people, even if doing so costs them money. If someone tells you that the problems black folks face are really just the problems that poor people face, they are telling you to ignore the libidinal economy. They are telling you that the political economy of capitalism is more important than the libidinal economy of antiblack racism. What is "libidinal economy"? In Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (2010, Duke University Press), black political theorist Frank Wilderson highlights the distinction between political economy and libidinal economy (p. 9): Jared Sexton describes libidinal economy as “the economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification (their condensation and displacement), and the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious.” Needless to say, libidinal economy functions variously across scales and is as “objective” as political economy. Importantly, it is linked not only to forms of attraction, affection and alliance, but also to aggression, destruction, and the violence of lethal consumption. He emphasizes that it is “the whole structure of psychic and emotional life,” something more than, but inclusive of or traversed by, what Gramsci and other marxists call a “structure of feeling”; it is “a dispensation of energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation.” What does all this mean? Let's interpret this elaborate definition and get to how it thinks of "economy." When we think of economy, we usually think of something having to do with money. Wilderson uses the term political economy to refer to economy in the ways that we usually think of it: the ways people exchange materials and decide on how things are valued. Economy doesn't just mean the economy in the sense of the stock market or banks, but also any means of determining whether something is worth doing or possessing based on how much capital and labor power it yields. In struggle, we see over and over that money talks and bullshit walks. Economy has to do with what they value moves people to act. Economies are therefore very important to political action. But can there be an economy that exchanges something other than money or capital? Yes. To understand "economy" as Wilderson and Sexton use it, we have to think of economy in a more general way as things of all kinds that we can trade or save. You can accumulate not only cash or material items, but also fears and desires. Certain people accumulate more fear (the black athlete) and desire (the blonde cheerleader) than others. The term libidinal economy refers to the systems of exchange and valuation for fantasies, desires, fears, aversions, and enjoyment. Economy is about exchange and accumulation. Everyone feels fear and aggression, but where is it directed? The libidinal is about both people's desires, fantasies, and pleasures AND their phobias, fears, and violent consumptions. A libidinal economy has to do with which groups a subject is attracted to, which groups it is willing to form alliances with, and which people it is willing to provide affection to. Where can we see this libidinal economy? How can we illustrate this distinction? The libido is the collection of things like phobias and desires that are unconscious and invisible but that have a visible effect on the world, including the money economy. Some examples: We see libidinal economies at work any time there is a response by state that is out of all proportion to the material effects of any practice they are regulating. The USA incarcerates three million people, despite the fact that doing so has an adverse impact on US financial security. Hence the libidinal economy of the fear of black and brown people (who together comprise the overwhelming majority of inmates) trumps the political economy of the cost-benefit analysis of maintaining prisons. Let's take another example of the powder - versus crack-cocaine distinction, in which the same drug is punished differently at the federal level. Because the two drugs are chemically identical, there shouldn't be any distinction between how their use and sale is punished. In 2010, the law made it so that these two drugs were punished the same, although the Obama administration isn't in any hurry to make the abolition of this distinction retroactive so that the mostly black and brown people who are locked up because of it will get released. But the legal abolition of this distinction is not essential for us to look at. What is essential is why that distinction was made in the first place. Wilderson's work suggests that, for civil society, black people pose a threat that has nothing to do with the chemical content or the social and cultural effects of crack. Simply by being associated with black people, crack is seen as 100 times more threatening than is powder cocaine. The financial and social costs of locking all those black and brown people up and the financial and social costs of allowing all those white people to go free and continue to sell does not really matter to civil society. What the powder- versus crack-cocaine distinction shows is the desire to contain the threat that blackness symbolizes. This is the mark of libidinal economy. Cops, soldiers, firemen are considered sexually desirable because they become the heroes of civil society. The Oscar Grant shooting. Amadou Diallo was a victim of a extreme kind of violence because of the phobias that converged on his body. What is the exchange? Civil society has an anxiety about crime, and crime is always attached to black in urban areas. Police don't have to get a monetary award, but they get the gratitude of civil society. How does this play out in ways that don't have to do strictly with money? The desire for them may not show up in the amount of money they make. Cops get rewarded for their aggression. When the cop slammed dude into the glass at BART. Prison guards, thought of as having the toughest beat on the planet. They get rewarded for being the last line of defense against George Jackson. Oscar Grant was an accumulation of aggression and phobias. Why are the black people in Prince George's County, Maryland, segregated from white people in their same socioeconomic bracket with the same kinds of high-value real estate, and the same kinds of political-economic values? Living around white people has a value that cannot be explained in strictly monetary terms. AFDC benefited mostly white single mothers, and enjoyed a long history of support from 1936-the 1960s. It initially excluded black people. By the 1960s, when black people started getting it, attitudes changed toward it, making it seem like it was undeserved and a drain on national prosperity, and by 1984, when Ronald Reagan referred to "welfare queens in Cadillacs," it was clear that AFDC was "a black thing." In actual statistical terms, it was still used mostly by white women. But once it became associated with poor black women, it was seen as in need of drastic, radical reforms. But is this "libidinal economy" really that important? Frank Wilderson is using the distinction between a money economy and an economy of desire over and over again throughout this book. Wilderson talks about this by talking about the difference between word and deed. This is not the hypocrisy of the system. It IS the logic of the system. So Europeans tried to resolve the lack of labor power by passing laws that reduced homeless white people to the status of slaves. In the end, however, they never really enforced these laws. Wilderson quotes David Eltis, an economic historian, who says that the costs of settling the "new world" would have been significantly reduced if Europeans has simply enslaved other Europeans. But, Wilderson points out, "what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the [symbolic value] which structures the libidinal economy of civil society." In other words, the symbolic costs of Europeans enslaving other Europeans would have been too great. Instead, they went to Africa for their slaves, even though the financial cost of doing so was much, much greater. The radical left doesn't make this distinction. Cornel West and Tavis Smiley say they want to organize a new Poor People's Campaign, but they won't be able to explain why this is a failed project from the start. This is because they won't think about the aspects of coalition building that have nothing to do with money or the lack of money. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the so-called "Reagan Democrats" were poor and working-class white people, many of them in unions, who voted overwhelmingly for Reagan against their own economic interest. The white left mistakenly thinks about the Reagan Democrats as people who were duped. They view them as an example of what Marx called "false consciousness" and they see it as their duty to inform the white poor and working class of why they should vote left. But there were all kinds of signs that white poor and working-class folks simply hated black people and didn't want to live anywhere that there was a large community of black people, even if those black people are of the same or higher socioeconomic status. The Reagan Democrats were excited by Reagan's antiblack rhetoric of law and order, a rhetoric that was in response against the activities of the Black Liberation Army, Weather Underground, Black Panthers, and Black Guerilla Family. Marxists think a person is in a state of false consciousness if her political or social interests go another way than her material or financial interests. If you adopt this view, then you probably think that the Reagan Democrats just need to be educated correctly about what they have in common with the black poor and working class. You have to think that their hatred of black people is somehow "false" simply because it runs counter to their financial interests. But this would be to ignore their interest in maintaining white supremacy and antiblack racism. One of the things white men would lose would be access to black bodies for sexual pleasure and amusement. These examples are not just isolated cases of false consciousness, ignorance, media manipulation, or some mystical thing called "prejudice." They are all of those things, but they are also something much, much greater that any student of struggle needs to be aware of. These examples reveal the contours of an economy of desires that is not primarily concerned with money. It's not that the political economy isn't also antiblack. In fact, both economies are antiblack.

### Case

#### Their aims to incorporate socially dead bodies within state-centric frameworks but ignores that the state is exactly why they are helpless. The 1AC performs an act of pornotroping from which they derive entertainment from saving those they are responsible for subjugating

Weheliye (Alexander G., professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University) 2014 (Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human, Duke University Press, pg. 90-91 C.A.)

Spillers has referred to the enactment of black suffering for a shocked and titillated audience as “pornotroping”: “This profound intimacy of in- terlocking detail is disrupted, however, by externally imposed meanings and uses: (1) the captive body as the source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality; (2) at the same time—in stunning contradiction—it is reduced to a thing, to being for the captor; (3) in this distance from a subject posi- tion, the captured sexualities provide a physical and biological expression of ‘otherness’; (4) as a category of ‘otherness,’ the captive body translates into a potential for pornotroping and embodies sheer physical powerless- ness that slides into a more general ‘powerlessness’” (“Mama’s Baby,” 206). Spillers directs our seeing to several facets of the body/flesh, human/not- quite-human, sovereign/bare life, and so on pas des deux in her insistence on the simultaneous thingness and sensuality of the slave, which lays bare the extralegal components of this volatile Ding. Pornotroping unconceals the literally bare, naked, and denuded dimensions of bare life, underscor- ing how political domination frequently produces a sexual dimension that cannot be controlled by the forces that (re)produce it. As Daphne Brooks remarks, “born out of diasporic plight and subject to pornotroping,” black flesh has “countenanced a ‘powerful stillness.’”5 The hieroglyphics of the flesh, embodied here by pornotroping, circumnavigate the connubial abyss of subjection and freedom, displaying at once the physical powerlessness of the dysselected slave subject and the untainted power of the selected mas- ter subject. In order to better follow Spillers’s brilliant coarticulation of porno and trope, a brief etymological detour is in order. Originally porno signified “pros- titute” and in the ancient Greek context whence it sprang, the term referred to female slaves that were sold expressly for prostitution. Also a derivation from Greek, trope, according to Hayden White, refers to “turn” and “way” or “manner”; later, by way of Latin, trope is aligned with “figure of speech.” White states the following of the palimpsestic structure of this word: “Tropes are deviations from literal, conventional, or ‘proper’ language use. . . . It is not only a deviation from one possible, proper, meaning, but also a de- viation towards another meaning.”6 In pornotroping, the double rotation White identifies at the heart of the trope figures the remainder of law and violence linguistically, staging the simultaneous sexualization and brutaliza- tion of the (female) slave, yet—and this marks its complexity—it remains unclear whether the turn or deviation is toward violence or sexuality.7 90 Chapter Six Pornotroping, then, names the becoming-flesh of the (black) body and forms a primary component in the processes by which human beings are converted into bare life. In the words of Saidiya Hartman, it marks “the means by which the wanton use of and the violence directed towards the black body come to be identified as its pleasure and dangers—that is, the expectations of slave property are ontologized as the innate capacities and inner feelings of the enslaved, and moreover, the ascription of excess and enjoyment to the African effaces the violence perpetrated against the enslaved.”8 The violence inflicted upon the enslaved body becomes syn- onymous with the projected surplus pleasure that always already moves in excess of the sovereign subject’s jouissance; pleasure (rapture) and vio- lence (bondage) deviate from and toward each other, setting in motion the historical happening of the slave thing: a potential for pornotroping.9 In Christina Sharpe’s words, the black body and flesh “become the bearers (through violence, regulation, transmission, etc.) of the knowledge of cer- tain subjection as well as the placeholders of freedom for those who would claim freedom as their rightful yield.”10 How does the historical question of violent political domination activate a surplus and excess of sexuality that simultaneously sustains and disfigures said brutality? Or what are the sexual dimensions of objectification in slavery and other forms of extreme political and social domination? My argument is not about erotics per se but dwells in the juxtaposition of violence as the antithesis of the human(e) (bondage) and “normal” sexuality (rapture) as the apposite property of this figure.11 Once again, I am bracketing questions of agency and resistance, since they obfuscate—and not in a productive way—the textures of enfleshment, that is, the modes of being which outlive the dusk of the law and the dawn of political violence